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THE CAMBRIDGE EQUATION WITH 
GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY REVISITED*
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Joanílio Rodolpho Teixeira***
ABSTRACT This paper offers an analysis of the steady-state distributional features 
found in a Kaldor-Pasinetti process, in which the government sector is allowed to 
run persistent defi cits that may be fi nanced through different instruments. Produc-
tive capital and bonds generate single rates of return, while workers’ saving propen-
sity remains uniform. This paper seeks to establish a generalization of Cambridge 
Eauqtion, considering the specifi c contributions of Steedman (1972), Pasinetti 
(1989), Dalziel (1991), and Faria (2000).
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A EQUAÇÃO DE CAMBRIDGE COM 
ATIVIDADE GOVERNAMENTAL REVISITADA
RESUMO Neste artigo faz-se uma análise das características distributivas do pro-
cesso Kaldor-Pasinetti, assumindo-se que o setor governamental incorre em persis-
tentes défi cits que podem ser fi nanciados através de diferentes instrumentos, como 
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a emissão de títulos e de moeda. Através dessa abordagem é possível estudar como 
a atividade governamental afeta a distribuição de renda entre capitalistas e trabal-
hadores e assim obter generalizações do Teorema de Cambridge em que versões 
anteriores como as de Steedman (1972), Pasinetti (1989), Dalziel (1991) e Faria 
(2000) surgem como casos particulares. 
Palavras-chave: Kaldor-Pasinetti; distribuição de renda; Teorema de Cam-
bridge.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Kaldor -Pasinetti process (K-P) could be characterized as having three 
groups of savers: the government plus two socioeconomic classes with differen-
tiated propensities to save. As a socioeconomic class, capitalists save from profi t 
income, while also exhibiting a higher propensity to save than workers, the sec-
ond socioeconomic class, who are characterized as saving both from profi ts and 
wages. The government’s savings behaviour is modelled symmetrically to other 
saving groups through fi xing a constant ratio between budget defi cits and dis-
posable income, measured as net taxes of interest payments.
One of the features of this type of model is the existence of a steady-state 
in which the profi t rate as well as the capitalist’s savings behaviour, and pos-
sibly the levels of government savings and tax rates, depend only on the 
growth, rate of output. An alternative equilibrium could arise, however, if 
the system’s given parameters prove to be inconsistent with the existence of 
capitalists. The existence of this alternative steady state has been explored by 
Meade (1966), Samuelson and Modigliani (1966), and Steedman (1972), 
showing that the alternative equilibrium could also emerge as a function of 
the profi t rate, and that this rate is not necessarily equal to the ratio of the 
growth rate to the workers’ propensity to save, but it could coexist with the 
Pasinetti equilibrium under the same savings and tax regime, along with a 
generalized production technology. Samuelson and Modigliani (1966) ar-
gue that Pasinetti’s model could give rise to an alternative balanced growth 
path if “pure” capitalists would cease to exist, violating the Cambridge Equa-
tion. Their anti-Pasinetti Theorem can be seen, however, as a simple at-
tempt to resurrect the marginal productivity theory, the condition required 
to attain the dual result being far from real world magnitudes [see Pasinetti 
(1974) and Kaldor (1966)].
If the capitalist’s propensity to save (and hence their existence) is incon-
sistent with the level of taxation, technology and government defi cits, the 
model could also fi nd a solution only in the absence of that class of savers. 
The possibility of the Pasinetti equilibrium’s inconsistency with exogenous 
elements of the system warrants the analysis of the necessary restrictions for 
a Pasinetti’s steady-state, which is one of the interesting features in the lit-
erature, combined with a simple formulation of a “Cambridge Equation.”
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An additional and equally important discussion involving the theorem 
behind the Cambridge Equation concerns the effects of government activity. 
Fleck and Domenghino (1987, 1990) have argued that the Cambridge Theo-
rem fails to hold if there exists a steady-state budget defi cit. Pasinetti (1989a, 
1989b) and Dalziel (1991)1 demonstrate errors in Fleck and Domenghino’s 
approach, while also demonstrating that Steedman’s (1972) analysis could 
be extended to consider the budget defi cit case. 
This paper considers the case of a private economy in which government 
does not own capital goods. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature. 
Section 3 considers the assumption that government fi nances its budget 
defi cits by selling bonds. In section 4, the government monetizes public 
defi cits. We seek to establish that versions of Pasinetti’s Result, advanced by 
Steedman (1972), Pasinetti (1989a, 1989b) and Dalziel (1991), serve as par-
ticular cases of the K-P model presented in this paper. The corollary we 
advance is that fi nancing a budget defi cit by debt creation or by issuing 
money fails to alter the essence of the Cambridge Theorem.
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE
Pasinetti’s model (1962) stems from Kaldor’s (1955) macroeconomic theo-
ry of growth and distribution. According to the former, when workers save, 
they gradually become owners of fi nancial assets. As a result, they receive 
both profi ts and wages as income. Pasinetti then shows that the equilibrium 
rate of profi ts, r, consistent with full employment, does not depend on 
workers’ propensity to save, but is equal to the natural growth rate, gn, di-
vided by capitalists’ propensity to save, sc. This relationship between and 
among variables is known as the Cambridge Equation: 
r = gn /sc.
This result, also termed the “Pasinetti Paradox” by Samuelson and Modi-
gliani (1966), was derived through considering the long-runsteady-state 
equilibrium for a closed economy without government, and it assumes that 
capitalists’ marginal propensity to consume is greater than that of workers. 
Subsequently:
sc > I/Y > sw,
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where I stands for investment and Y for production. Rewriting this in-
equality in the form of sw = I/Y, Meade (1966), as well as Samuelson and 
Modigliani (1966), concluded that the “Cambridge Result” provided a 
possible steady-state solution, and not the most general solution. Ac-
cording to these contributors, the dual result, that is, the anti-Pasinetti 
equilibrium, also appears and stands fully symmetric to the Cambridge 
Equation. 
However, Meade’s attack has limited signifi cance, since the anti-Pasi-
netti equilibrium holds only in the case where the steady-state solution 
implies the capitalists’ euthanasia. Following Pasinetti (1974, p. 130), “[i]f 
capitalists were not to exist anymore, their propensity to save obviously 
could not determine the rate of profi t. There is therefore a way of prevent-
ing the Cambridge Equation from operating, and that is by eliminating 
capitalists from the system.”
After this initial debate, the focus on the Cambridge Equation shifted 
toward an analysis of its validity when considering government taxation 
and spending activities. Steedman (1972, p. 138) has shown that in this 
case a Pasinettian equilibrium emerges, in which the rate of profi t is not 
dependent upon production methods. By considering a perfectly balanced 
government budget, Steedman arrived at the following version of the 
Cambridge Theorem: 
 (1)
where 0 < tp < 1 is the (average and marginal) tax rate on profi ts. 
Steedman’s extension involves direct taxation and a balanced budget, 
holding on to the general thrust and refl ecting the essence of the original 
Cambridge Theorem. Namely, the propensity for savings on the part of cap-
italists proves to be the key for determining the rate of profi t. Fleck and 
Domenghino (1990, 1987) challenged Steedman’s view, arguing that his con-
tribution remains a limited case of a perfectly balanced government budget. 
They also argue that, in cases of a steady-state budget defi cit, the workers’ 
propensity to save is what matters when determining rates of profi t. Pasi-
netti (1989a, 1989b), however, counter-attacked their challenge, showing 
that, even in the cases of budget defi cits or superavits, a more correct version 
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where sg, is the government’s savings rate. Naturally, if sg < 0 or sg > 0, the 
equation above is still valid, with the proviso that the second term in the 
denominator is negative or positive, respectively.2 Here we will not be con-
cerned with the case in which sg > 0, the case of government permanent 
superavit. 
This debate seems to have been settled. However, a minor disagreement 
arose between those who defended the Cambridge Equation. On one side 
of the debate, Denicolò and Matteuzzi (1990), Dalziel (1991) and Araujo 
(1992) have argued that equation (1) would also hold independently of gov-
ernment budget defi cits or surpluses. In short, the government’s propensity 
to save does not matter when determining the rate of profi t, as argued by 
Pasinetti in expression (2). In section 3, below, we shall deconstruct and 
expose shortcomings that have not been addressed nor resolved, so far. This 
constitutes the main contribution of our paper. 
 3. PUBLIC DEBT CREATION 
The economy consists of households, fi rms and the government. House-
holds are divided into two classes: capitalists, whose main source of income 
is earnings from capital, and workers, who are mixed-income receivers. In 
this economy, ownerships are private. Capitalists and workers decide their 
own savings ratios. But the government may affect the overall savings ratio 
through the redistribution of income. For the sake of clarity of exposition, 
we shall consider an elementary version of the Kaldor-Pasinetti process in 
which there is direct taxation3 only. Suppose, for example, that a unique net 
direct tax, tp, applies to all kinds of profi t income, irrespective of it being 
earned by capitalists or workers. It is also reasonable to assume that the gov-
ernment will not pay taxes to itself. According to Dalziel (1991), the govern-
ment’s savings, Sg, is given by:
 ,  (3)
r =
g n
(1 tp) sc + sg tp
  
Sg = T G rA = s g (T t piA)
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where T stands for the total taxation, G for the government’s expenditures, 
and A for the public debt in period t. Let us fi rst consider a case in which the 
government fi nances its budget defi cits by issuing bonds. By making A the 
stock of government bonds, then it varies according to:
A
• 
= – Sg (T – tp iA) (4)
We consider that i is the nominal interest rate that in the absence of an 
expected and/or actual infl ation is equal to the real interest rate r. In this 
case, expression (4) may be written as:
A
• 
= – Sg (T – tp rA) (5)
Let us keep the assumption that capitalists fi nance a constant fraction λ, 
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 , of the public debt, which is the same as assuming that they fi -
nance the same proportion of government defi cits each period of time. 
Hence, A
•
c = λ A = – λsg (T – tp rA). Consequently, capitalists receive an inter-
est payment r λ A in every period. Assuming that interest receipts are taxed 
at the same rate as profi ts, capitalists’ income may be written as:
Yc = (1 – tp) [rKc + r λA] (6)
In this case, their savings is:
Sc = sc Yc = sc (1 – tp) [rKc + r λA] (7)
As long as a fraction λ of the budget defi cits is fi nanced by capitalists in 
each period of time, the capitalists’ investment Ic , is given by:
Ic = sc Yc + λ (T – G – rA) = sc (1 – tp)[rKc + r λA] + λsg (T – tp rA) (8)










c = scr (1 – tp)[Kc + λA] + λsg (T – tp rA) (9)
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Dividing both sides of (9) by Kc , we obtain:
     
 (10)
 
In a steady-state, the growth rate of capital and government bonds 
remains constant, namely  . Noticing that Ac = λA, equa tion 
(10) can be rewritten as: 
gn (1 + α λ) = scr (1 – tp) (1 + λα) + λsg τ – λsgrαtp (11)
where  and . After some algebraic manipulation, we could 
derive an extended version of the Cambridge Equation as: 
 (12) 
Note that if λ = 0, that is, when only workers own government bonds, we 
obtain the Steedman’s (1972) version of the Cambridge Equation with gov-
ernment. If a particular fraction of the budget defi cits or surpluses are fi -
nanced or invested by capitalists, then we obtain Pasinetti’s (1989a, 1989b) 
version of the Cambridge Result. The value of λ that gives rise to Pasinetti’s 
version is formulated in the following expression:
 
 (13)
In conclusion, both Stedman’s (1972) and Pasinetti’s (1989a, 1989b) ver-
sions may well be more correctly viewed as particular cases of our approach. 
In our formulation, workers’ savings behaviour does not play a role in the 
determination of the rate of profi t. That is, by fi nancing budget defi cits 
through issuing bonds, the government fails to alter the essence of the Cam-
bridge Equation. 
• •
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4. MONETIZING PUBLIC DEFICITS
Recently a number of authors, such as Commendatore (2002), Palley (1996, 
2002), Park (2002, 2004, 2006) and Seccareccia (1996), have dealt with the 
case in which money is introduced in the K-P framework. In this model, the 
existence of money may well be explained by purely transactional reasons. 
The general result found is that the validity of the Cambridge Equation 
holds independently of the way in which money is introduced in the econ-
omy. Here, let us assume that money is incorporated into the K-P process in 
order to monetize budget defi cits. In this vein, the government does not is-
sue government bonds, instead it monetizes budget defi cits according to the 
following equation:
 , (14)
where M is the stock of money, p is the price level, and real money balances 
are defi ned as m ≡ M / p. We assume that capitalists hold a constant fraction 
θ , 0 ≤ θ < 1 of the stock of money, thus: 
 
Mc = θ M → mc = θ m (15)




 c + m
•
 c = sc (1 – tp)rKc – θsg T + πmc (16)
where  is the rate of infl ation. In a steady-state, we have , 
consequently,  . Dividing both sides of (16) by Kc yields:
 
(17)
Rewriting (17) and considering that m•
 
c = gnmc and  , we obtain:
gn = sc (1 – tp)r – θsg τ + πδ – gnδ (18)
• ••
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From (18) we could then derive the Cambridge Theorem for the case in 
which the government monetizes the public defi cits as:
 
(19)
Expression (19) keeps the essence of the Cambridge Equation despite the 
inclusion of monetary variables: the rate of profi t is determined indepen-
dently of the workers’ propensity to save. If θ = 0, that is, if capitalists do not 
hold money in the steady-state equilibrium, we arrive at Faria’s (2000) ver-
sion of the Cambridge Result with money and infl ation. However, if capital-
ists hold money in equilibrium, we arrive at Dalziel’s (1991) version of the 
Cambridge Equation, where θ is given by the following expression:
 (20)
Therefore, equation (19) can be seen as a more general version of the 
Cambridge Equation when the government monetizes public defi cits. An 
interesting property that arises from this analysis is that money is not super-
neutral, since the rate of monetary expansion has effects over the long run 
capital stock of the economy and functional distribution of income. It is 
worth to remember that, by performing his analysis in a Neoclassical model, 
Sidrauski (1967) has found that money is super-neutral. In addition, this 
new version keeps the essence of the Cambridge Theorem since workers’ 
propensity to save does not matter when determining the rate of profi t. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, through modelling an economy in which government budget 
defi cits — or superavits — is either fi nanced or invested by capitalists and/
or workers, we have derived a new version of the Cambridge Equation. 
When public defi cits are totally fi nanced by workers, the model generates 
the Steedman’s (1972) version of the Cambridge Result. When capitalists 
hold part of the government bonds, we obtain Pasinetti’s (1989a, 1989b) 
version. If the public defi cits are monetized, we arrive at Faria’s (2000) ver-
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sion of the Cambridge Equation, with money and the rate of infl ation de-
rived for the case in which capitalists fail to hold money in a steady-state. 
Dalziel’s (1991) case is obtained if and when capitalists hold money in equi-
librium. Finally, it should be stressed that the government’s decisions re-
garding the fi nancing of a budget defi cit through debt creation or issuing 
money fails to alter the essence of the Cambridge Equation. This result 
reinforces previous positions by Dalziel (1989), Pasinetti (1989a,1989b), 
Denicolò & Matteuzi (1990), Araujo (1992) and Teixeira (1999), who have 
shown that the validity of a version of the Cambridge Theorem is not lim-
ited to the case of balanced budget.
NOTES
 1. Bortis (1993, p. 115) concludes that “the debate provoked by Fleck and Domenghino 
(1990) has been largely settled by a ‘generalization and a simplifi cation of the Cam-
bridge Theorem with budget defi cits’ (Dalziel 1991).” The expressions Cambridge Theo-
rem, Cambridge Result, Pasinetti’s and Cambridge Equation are interchangeable. 
 2. As a consequence, expression (1) appears to be a particular case of a balanced 
budget, in which sg = 0.
 3. Pasinetti (1989) and O’Connel (1995) deal with a more complex arrangement, since 
their approaches consider both direct and indirect taxes.
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